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The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 
By Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa (Liz) Chung and Claire Balchin 
Recent decades have seen tremendous acceleration in international investment arbitration. 
A rapidly-expanding web of international treaties has substantially increased the protection of 
foreign investment and given investors direct remedies against host governments. But, over the 
last few years, cracks have started to appear in the investment regime. Investment arbitration 
now attracts a substantial amount of public scrutiny. With arbitrators sitting in judgment over a 
wide range of national policies, some stakeholders challenge their legitimacy. 
Commentators increasingly question whether a backlash against the foreign investment 
regime is underway.1 This book, the outgrowth of a conference organized by the editors at 
Harvard Law School on April 19, 2008, aims to uncover the drivers behind the backlash against 
the current international investment regime. A diverse set of contributors reflect on the current 
state and the future direction of the international investment regime, and offer some tentative 
solutions for improvement: academics, practitioners, government officials and civil society. 
Contributors assess whether the current regime of investment arbitration is in crisis. They 
take a step back to look at the long-term prospects of investment arbitration, including reforms 
that could bring substantial improvements to the investment arbitration process. Some 
contributors answer questions that Gus Van Harten posed in his public law critique of the current 
international investment regime.2 Others offer refinements, propose alternative viewpoints and 
                                                 
1 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY – ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 
(CHRISTINA BINDER ET. AL, EDS.), Part VIII, pages 801-916 examines the future of investment arbitration. In the 
Preface, the editors note that international investment law and arbitration “while no doubt still a booming branch of 
international law, currently face challenges that aim at the heart of the matter”; Charles N. Brower, Charles H. 
Brower II, and Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication, 19 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 
415 (2003) (noting that the traditional “elements and perceptions of legitimacy are too often spectacularly absent”); 
Charles N. Brower, Michael Ottolgenhi, and Peter Prows, The Saga of CMS: Res Judicata, Precedent, and the 
Legitimacy of ICSID Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY – ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER (CHRISTINA BINDER ET. AL, EDS.), 843-864, at 845 (referring to “the increasingly 
strident legal and political pushback [...that...] call into question in various ways whether ICSID arbitration will 
continue to be a useful and legitimate forum for resolving international disputes.”; David W. Rivkin, Towards a New 
Paradigm in International Arbitration: The Elder Town Model Revisited, 24 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 375 
(2008), at 377 (acknowledging “a crisis that we must find ways to resolve if international arbitration is going to 
continue to be the favored means of resolving international disputes”); Alan Beattie, Concern grows over global 
trade regulation, Financial Times, March 12 2008 (“quoting Hillary Clinton: “We are going to take out the ability of 
foreign companies to sue us because of what we do to protect our workers.”) The British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law has organized several conferences that address elements of the backlash: “Implications of the 
global financial crises for investment arbitration” (February 2009), “Investment Protection – Change or Decline?” 
(March 2009), “Host State Perspectives” (May 2009) and “Ethics, Issue Conflicts and Arbitrator Challenges” 
(September 2009). In April 2009, the Institute for Transnational Arbitration and the American Society for 
International Law hosted a conference entitled “When Arbitration goes Bad”. In January 2009, the Vale Columbia 
Centre on Sustainable International Investment, a joint undertaking of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute, 
sent a Memo to President Obama on “Improving the International Investment Regime: priorities for a new U.S. 
Administration” (“the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international investment regime hinges on its ability to 
serve the interests of all its principal stakeholders and hence to maintain its global acceptance”).   
2 GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007). 
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defend the status quo. Still others address overlooked topics, such as denial of benefits clauses3 
and the potential unsettling effect of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) declared to be 
incompatible with European Union law.4 
 
To dispel potential misconceptions in advance, this book affirmatively does not aim to 
add further fuel to the backlash. Rather, the project is premised on the belief that an investment 
arbitration regime in listening mode and ready to adapt may draw tremendous strength from 
constructive criticism.5 It is worth keeping in mind that it is far easier to criticize existing 
arrangements than to propose meaningful and viable alternatives. But a range of serious 
questions addressed in this volume about the sustainability and future direction of investment 
arbitration demand answers capable of general acceptance. 
 
These questions can no longer be ignored or be dismissed as esoteric criticisms by fringe 
groups or outsiders with no stake in the system. Without appropriate remedial action, the rising 
discontent over the perceived and actual problems of the international investment regime risks 
undermining the tremendous gains in the rule of law on cross-border investment flows achieved 
over the last decades. Unless acknowledged and addressed, these concerns could throw the baby 
out with the bathwater. All parties would lose: not only host countries and investors, but also 
arbitration practitioners. 
 
The Nature of the Critique: Procedural or Substantive? 
The critiques aimed at the investment regime tend to divide into two categories: 
procedural and substantive. For several years now, particularly following the entry into force of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), academics and civil society groups have 
called for additional procedural safeguards. These demands fall under the broad banner of 
transparency, which may be understood to encompass, among other aspects, requirements of 
publicity and administrative fairness.  
 
In 2001, the following powerful indictment of NAFTA Chapter 11 proceedings in the 
New York Times gained notoriety:  
Their meetings are secret. Their members are generally unknown. The decisions they 
reach need not be fully disclosed. Yet the way a small number of international tribunals 
handles disputes between investors and foreign governments has led to national laws 
being revoked, justice systems questioned and environmental regulations challenged.6 
                                                 
3 Mark Beckett & Rachel Thorn, xxx. 
4 Markus Burgstaller explores how a recent judgment by the European Court of Justice could unravel a number of 
intra-EU BITs, or at least, require their renegotiation,  xxx. 
5 Brower, Ottolenghi & Prows, supra note 1, at 863 (“ICSID arbitration has drawn its share of criticisms from all 
sides and this ultimately may be reflective of the overall vitality of the system. As a practical matter, any system of 
dispute settlement called upon to review the propriety of oficial acts will result in winners and losers.” “Some 
growing pains were probably inevitable.” They end on an optimistic note: “the continued good faith and critical eye 
of the internacional arbitration community, are providing a sound foundation for the future.” (at 864).  
6 Anthony DePalma, Nafta’s Powerful Little Secret: Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, 
New York Times, March 11 2001 (highlighting the public’s unease about ad hoc panels drawn from lists of 
academics and international lawyers almost unknown outside their highly specialized fields and quoting Joan 
Claybroak, president of Public Citizen, referring to “secret government”, where “governments [are] using Nafta not 
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This quote encapsulates widespread and serious concerns about the operation and effects of 
investment arbitration, especially from outsiders who hear about investment arbitration only 
indirectly: an alleged lack of democratic accountability, a shrinking of domestic policy space7 
and pervasive confidentiality. But even some arbitration practitioners, increasingly question the 
traditional advantages of this tailor-made method of dispute resolution across borders—such as 
speed, low cost and neutrality.8 There are growing concerns that international arbitration is 
losing its long-standing edge over litigation in domestic courts. 
 
Another procedural criticism levelled at the investment regime concerns the conflicts of 
interest at play in the world of international arbitration. Professor William Park describes the 
many possible conflicts that may arise and provides some suggestions for identifying and 
resolving them. He acknowledges the potential for conscious and unconscious bias, 
differentiating between the various levels of conflict that may characterize the arbitral arena. Yet 
he remains committed to the current model of international arbitration and hopeful about the 
capacity for evolution. 
 
Yet the progress toward procedural transparency since that New York Times article has 
been promising. International arbitral tribunals have consistently permitted third party 
participation through the submission of amicus curiae briefs and NAFTA tribunals have opened 
up their hearings to the public. Developed country investors and host States alike seem to 
understand the importance of securing democratic legitimacy. Nonetheless, pleadings and even 
decisions often remain confidential, making meaningful amicus curiae participation difficult and 
leaving the public to speculate about the allegations and reasoning behind the result. 
 
Agreement on the substantive problems of investment arbitration and desirable 
modifications is more elusive. Progress is hard to assess by any standard. One criticism has to do 
with the interpretation and application of investment law. For example, the CMS Annulment 
Committee9 remarked that the CMS tribunal applied the law “cryptically and defectively”10 and 
regarded a central part of the award’s legal reasoning as erroneous, stating: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
to defend trade but to challenge the functioning of government.”). A recent article in The Economist, hardly a 
suspect of hot-headed radicalism, expresses similar concerns, Behind closed doors – A hard struggle to shed some 
light on a legal grey area (“things which may well be in the public interest to know are hidden from view”). Cf. also 
Robert Y. Jennings, The Judiciary, International and National and the Development of International Law, 45 ILCQ 
1 (1996) (in international adjudication it is “difficult to find out what is going on, much less to study it”, at 5). 
Charles Brower II, Obstacles and Pathways to Consideration of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Disputes, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY YEARBOOK 2008-2009 (ED. KARL SAUVANT) (2009), at 367 (the 
view that investment arbitration serves to “exclude the potential for troublesome arguments regarding the public 
interest ... fuels mainstream concerns that investment treaties subvert the democratic process. Because this position 
tends to invite backlash, because investment treaties are not suicide pacts, and because it makes no sense to ignore 
the issues that have become preoccupations for host countries ...”).  
7 For a similar argument in the WTO context, Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, Mich. L. Rev. 
(emphasizing the need for input legitimacy and for enough politics in international trade law).   
8 Rivkin, supra note 1 (urging a radical return to basics in settling disputes through arbitration).   
9 CMS Gas Tranmssission v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Annulment Decision, 15 Sept. 
2007, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CMSAnnulmentDecision.pdf.  
10 CMS Annulment, Para. 136. 
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Throughout its consideration of the Award, the Committee has identified a series of 
errors and defects. The Award contained manifest errors of law. It suffered from lacunae 
and elisions. All this has been identified and underlined by the Committee.11 
 
Yet the ICSID Convention permits annulment only for “manifest errors of law”.12 The 
Committee’s expansive commentary on that point, despite its limited mandate, seems to be 
directed at the general investment arbitration community. Such criticism from within fulfils a 
dual function. First, it shores up the system’s legitimacy by bringing bad practices to light and 
opening the way for catharsis in future cases. Second, it serves as a warning shot: Change course 
or risk putting the long-run health of the entire regime at risk. 
 
Louis Wells makes a broader point in his contribution to this volume. As he explains, 
many members of the international investment arbitration community continue to be immersed in 
points of law, rather than exploring the viability and the effects of investment arbitration as a 
whole.13 He urges arbitration panels to take a more pragmatic approach. Foreign investors seek 
renegotiations of their investment contracts with some frequency when conditions for their 
investment have changed materially. Yet when similar adverse circumstances affect the host 
government, tribunals adopt a very rigid view of contracts, rather than encouraging the parties to 
realize potential joint gains from renegotiating their agreement.  
In a similar vein, Anne van Aaken suggests that host state’s ex ante commitment needs to 
be balanced with a degree of flexibility ex post. Contract theory suggests that under changing 
conditions overly strict commitments are detrimental to the long-run interests of the parties. 
Overly broad commitments without states being accorded sufficient flexibility by tribunals may 
lead to states voting with their feet and leaving the system altogether. Alternative measure are 
also increasingly used, such as renegotiation or termination of BITs, restrictions on international 
arbitration in constitutional law, the non-compliance with awards or the clarification of 
ambiguous terms by authentic interpretation of the two state parties. 
Ilija Mitrev Penusliski explores alternatives to arbitrating investment disputes. In some 
cases, foreign investors and host governments leave gains on the table by resorting to a purely 
right-based, adversarial approach. Often, arbitration escalates the dispute, is long, expensive and 
severs business relations permanently. Interest-based alternatives such as mediation might leave 
both parties better off. 
Louis Wells and Gabriel Bottini advocate that arbitration tribunals display more 
sensitivity to allegations of corruption. Bottini goes so far as to suggest that tribunals should, as a 
general rule, decline to exercise jurisdiction over investment disputes tainted by corruption. 
Corruption renders investments illegal. This bright-line rule is said to be in line with 
international public policy, lowering economic growth as well as weakening state institutions 
and the rule of law in host countries. Arbitral tribunals ought to work hand-in-glove with national 
courts that are often better at gathering evidence on corruption and other illegalities.   
                                                 
11 CMS Annulment, para. 158. 
12 Christina Knahr’s contribution discusses the requirements of anulments and the challenges it presents in greater 
detail, xxx.  
13 [xxx]. 
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This is related to a second critique that cuts to the substance of the investment regime. 
Raised most frequently by states in Latin America, this critique focuses on the broad 
interpretation of treaty obligations. William Burke-White argues that the responses given by 
arbitral tribunals to Argentina’s deep economic crisis in the early 2000s puts the entire 
investment arbitration regime at risk. Tribunals have, by and large, made it impossible for states 
to invoke necessity under customary international law and the security exception in BITs when 
they find themselves in economic crises. Tribunals fail to give host states an adequate margin of 
appreciation in relying on necessity, despite contrary intent of the state parties to the BIT. If 
Argentina were to exit the system as a result of such overbroad interpretations, investor-state 
arbitration would suffer a serious crisis of confidence. All those interested in having a viable 
international investment regime in place beyond the medium-term need to urgently realize what 
damage overzealous treaty interpretation in favour of the investor is doing to the system in the 
long run.  
 
Tim Nelson disagrees with the contention that the current international investment regime 
is fragile. Historical experience, he contends, shows that the institution of investor-state 
arbitration is very durable, capable of surviving changing economic and political conditions, and 
even revolution and civil upheaval. Both states and investors value the certainty and the added 
enforcement probabilities that investor-state arbitration provides. The concern that a regionally 
limited backlash against ICSID, in particular in the form of the ALBA movement in Latin 
America, could snowball into a global revolt against investor-state arbitration is unfounded. The 
investment regime will survive this hick-up, just like others in the past.  
 
To this end, some analysis of particular treaty obligations is helpful. Mark Beckett and 
Rachel Thorn explore the denial of benefits clause in BITs and the definition of investor. [NTD: 
Describe further].  
 
Alejandro Turyn and Facundo Perez Aznar take a different tack as they seek to find the 
balance between host State regulatory space and foreign investor protections. Their chapter 
examines the transfer of funds clause that could become a focal point of future arbitrations, as 
the recent financial crisis has put exchange controls back in fashion. They place the clause in the 
context of general international law, and conclude that the obligation was never intended to 
provide the investor with an absolute right to transfer funds out of the country. Moreover, Turyn 
and Aznar contend that the free transfers provision must be understood to be in a relationship 
with other treaty and customary international law obligations, such as state defences. Alexis 
Martinez explores a whole range of state defences in greater detail.   
 
To complicate the picture, some criticisms have both procedural and substantive aspects, 
such as concerns about parallel proceedings and conflicting awards. Richard Kreindler and 
August Reinisch analyze the consequences of forum shopping in fascinating detail. They explore 
the many different forms that parallel proceedings may take and the troublesome results of 
adjudicating a claim with more than one seat of arbitration, set of arbitral rules, and applicable 
substantive law. Christina Knahr develops this  analysis further, exploring the possibilities for 
conflicting awards in the context of annulment. She concludes that ICSID annulment procedures, 
while valuable, are not sufficient to resolve the issue of conflicting awards.  
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Historical Context 
 
The historical context is important. The current regime builds on the remnants of past 
dispute settlement mechanisms. Investment disputes have existed for decades, long before the 
revolution of direct investor standing and the proliferation of BITs. Disputes were resolved 
through diplomatic protection, negotiation, or sometimes litigation in national courts.  
 
James Crawford recently identified a number of continuities in the “brave new world” of 
international dispute settlement, which turns out to share a great deal with arbitration in the 19th 
century.14 One of these continuities is a struggle against ad hoc dispute settlement in the form of 
increased institutionalization that started in the 20th century and remains incomplete. History 
lurks in the shadows. Sometimes perhaps even today arbitrators remain too beholden to the 
parties to deliver just and legally sound decision to the arbitrators.  
  
Few contest the insufficiency of these mechanisms in today’s globalized economy. In his 
chapter, Tillmann Rudolf Braun examines the effects of globalization on the development of 
international investment law. He analyzes the juridification of key relationships in the global 
economy, the changing role of states, and the resulting pressures on national sovereignty. Other 
chapters, such as the one by Markus Burgstaller, focus on specific new challenges that face the 
BIT regime in a dynamic world. He writes about the relationship between European Union Law 
and BITs. As both regimes expand their reach, they complement and conflict in unexpected 
ways, leading to strains and inconsistencies.   
 
Yet Stephan Schill reminds us in his contribution that investor standing is a revolutionary 
development worth keeping. Investor-state arbitration evolved to fill gaps and shortcomings in 
the existing foreign investment dispute settlement framework and should not be discarded 
lightly, nor should detractors sell the system short without considering meaningful alternatives. 
Schill describes the shortcomings of earlier alternatives, revealing the flaws in each. 
Nonetheless, a step into the past is always a useful starting point for an assessment of the 
present. During the short time frame stretching from the first BIT, concluded in 1959, to the 
present, the investment regime has already undergone several waves. Capital-importing states, 
formerly opposed to the obligations contained in such treaties, signed on with vigour. The earlier 
opposition by developing countries became the proclamation of a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO). This culminated in Resolution 3281, which codified the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States.15 The Charter asserted national sovereignty over the property rights 
of foreigners and clarified that the compensation for expropriation would be settled under the 
domestic law of the nationalizing state and by its tribunals. There was no mention of 
international law or international arbitration.  
 
                                                 
14 James Crawford, Continuity and Discontinuity in International Dispute Settlement, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY – ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER (CHRISTINA BINDER ET. 
AL, EDS.), at 802.   
15 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 12, 1974), 14 
I.L.M. 251 (1975) [1974 Charter].  See also Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S–VI), U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 1974), 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974); Programme of Action on 
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202 (S–VI), U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 
1974), 13 I.L.M. 729 (1974). 
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The rapid pace at which BITs were concluded after the 1980s had much to do with 
structural changes on the international scene.16 The reversal of stance that brought these 
countries to the BIT negotiating table was slow and steady, picking up momentum as the 
arbitration world moved into the 1990s, and accelerating after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
onset of economic transition to market-based economies in many countries around the world.  
Foreign investment became the buzzword of international relations, espoused by international 
institutions and promoted by economists. Yet, the rapid fire conclusion of BITs has since slowed 
and the symptoms of the backlash continue to grow.   
 
What is the legacy of the comparatively short history of the BIT?  
 
On a broad level, inherent contradictions characterize the BIT revolution over the last 
decades. Underlying the surge in bilateral investment treaties is a belief that protection of 
investor interests will invariably, without further state intervention, lead to the public good. This 
is tied to the belief that BITs increase or facilitate foreign investment, a premise called into 
question in the contribution by Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons, Their 
statistics reveal a tenuous relationship between foreign direct investment and bilateral investment 
treaties. The central reason is that the pool of money that investors are willing to invest in 
developing countries is limited. States compete for this scare pool by offering ever more 
attractive conditions to foreign investors, engaging in an arms race. They would likely be better 
off if they could collectively commit not to undertake this race to the bottom. 
 
 A second thread is a deep distrust of government, seen as prone to populist pressures, 
with a weak commitment to legal predictability and contract enforcement, beholden to irrational 
goals. Arbitrators serve as an objective safety valve, impartial, objective and independent.17 They 
ensure that private property is shielded from state interference and impose compensation when 
property rights are violated. This function shares similarities with national courts ensuring that 
governments do not take property without adequate compensation. The contributions of Anne 
van Aaken and Stephan Schill explore this point, among others, in greater detail.  
 
 At bottom, such contradictions and concerns often boil down to the concept of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty is a highly contested concept and tends to look different depending on 
the vantage point. It can be subdivided seemingly ad infinitum so that there is economic 
sovereignty, regulatory sovereignty, political sovereignty, military sovereignty and so on. 
Concerns and critiques about the investment regime tend to locate themselves somewhere within 
the concept. Procedural demands often invoke domestic sovereignty by requiring democratic 
legitimacy and accountability on the part of the host State. Substantive demands may invoke 
regulatory sovereignty as the host State seeks to carve out a space safe from the scrutiny of 
international arbitration. The key point for the backlash, however, is that the concept of 
sovereignty is fluid and dynamic. It can and has been mobilized by groups on all sides of debate. 
From the Calvo Clause to the NIEO to calls for restraint under NAFTA Chapter 11, sovereignty 
has proven its malleability. For that very reason, some regard it as an empty shell. Meaningful 
                                                 
16 Gus van Harten, supra note 2,at 42. 
17 Martti Koskenniemi, The Ideology of International Arbitration, Sept. 7 2007, The Hague; see generally DAVID 
SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION – INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S 
PROMISE (2008).  
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discussions about the backlash will need reach some accommodation on the meaning and scope 
of the term. 
 
Despite periodic assertions to the contrary, no consensus on the international rules 
governing cross-border capital flows and investment has emerged. Even though the debate is less 
ideologically charged today compared to the 1970s, positions continue to diverge substantially. 
The superficial consensus that enabled the conclusion and widespread acceptance of the ICSID 
Convention is fragile. At least in that respect, the end of history was a chimera. The most 
spectacular example of these frictions is the failed MAI, but this is just the most obvious.18 
Against this background, to confine the real and important debates to the ash heaps of history 
seems mistaken. If critical questions are ignored or simply glossed over as is common nowadays, 
they are likely to return with a vengeance.  
 
Investment Arbitration and its Discontents 
 
One may deny that there is systemic crisis in international investment arbitration, but it is 
no longer possible to deny that a backlash is gathering force. Luke Eric Peterson’s contribution 
explains why public scrutiny and dismay about the system’s shortcomings is on the rise. In this 
sense, at least, the backlash is real, and apparent in a number of recent developments. For 
instance, the United States rewrote its Model BIT in 200419; NAFTA parties issued a clarifying 
statement that cut back on NAFTA’s protections20; a widespread sense that investment tribunals 
failed to develop balanced solutions for cases arising out of Argentina’s financial crises in 2001, 
and the possibility that Argentina could chose not to comply with the awards.   
States – the most important stakeholders – have also started to assume a critical position. 
Bolivia denounced the ICSID Convention in 2005 and attempted to renegotiate all of its BITs. 
One aim was to steer dispute resolution to domestic fora, rather than international arbitration. 
Bolivia alleged bias, and expressed concern about the lack of appeals mechanism and the 
confidentiality of ICSID proceedings.21 This rupture with ICSID generated alarm among 
international investment lawyers. Yet most took comfort in the fact that Bolivia’s economy was 
too small to really matter, that the move did not trigger a domino effect, as some had feared in 
Argentina in particular and that many of Bolivia’s BITs provide for non-ICISD arbitration such 
as under UNCITRAL rules. 
Ecuador recently joined Bolivia in turning its back on ICSID.22 Other states, in particular 
in Latin America, have mooted similar moves, including Nicaragua and Venezuela. Their leaders 
united in June 2009 to host a panel at the United Nations about closing down the ICSID. 
                                                 
18 The draft agreement, along with the commentary, may be found at http://www.oecd.org. 
19 Explain why many see the model as a regression.  
20 Provide source. 
21 Investment Treaty News, May 9, 2008, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn_may9_2007.pdf (quoting President 
Morales from the Washington Post “(We) emphatically reject the legal, media and diplomatic pressure of some 
multinationals that ... resist the sovereign rulings of countries, making threats and initiating suits in international 
arbitration”; Letter from 134 NGOs to ICSID, June 21 2007,  http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/world-
water/right/icsid-letter (applauding Bolivia’s “courageous and important decision” from ICSID, an institution that is 
“not an objective, neutral or impartial dispute resolution mechanism”, whereas [m]ost ICSID cases result in 
compensation to the investor.” 
22  
9 
 
Argentina, the state that appears most often as a respondent, thus far remains committed to 
ICSID. However, the country has assumed a combative stance, for instance, by seeking the 
annulment of every award issued against it. Some Latin American countries plan to renegotiate 
or else terminate their BITs. Several developed countries adopted legislation to screen foreign 
investments for national security, a barrier to admission of new investments.23  
Other reasons for the backlash include: doubts about whether BITs increase foreign 
investment; inadequate representation of developing countries among the panels of arbitrators; 
an alleged institutional bias or unfairness typical of major arbitral institutions such as ICSID; the 
tension, and at times subordination, of the public interest to commercial interests; the lack of 
transparency and conflicts of interest.24 
 
Looking Ahead 
 
The current global economic crisis subjects economic openness in respect of capital flows 
and investment to stress tests. Over the coming years, governments and users of investment 
arbitration will re-evaluate their priorities. This shift could have profound implications for the 
foreign investment regime. The current crisis might turn a minority’s critique into the 
mainstream, and catalyze change that has long been in the offing. When British or German 
support for investment arbitration wanes, the system could crumble, with no ready alternative in 
its place.  
The Achilles heel of the current investment regime is a loss of confidence among leading 
stakeholders – major developed countries. As we have seen with debate on inward investment by 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), national anxieties about foreign investment in the developed 
world run at a similar level of those in developing countries.25 The SWF debate could just be the 
precursor of a pronounced turn towards autarky in the wake of the global financial crisis that 
started, in particular if major developed countries are routinely called upon to defend their policy 
response to the crisis before arbitral tribunals. A string of arbitrations with them as respondents 
could be the chief vehicle of rising opposition to the central support of the current investment 
regime. Mehmet Thoral and Thomas Schultz explore this new, and perhaps in the future quite 
common, reversal of fortunes in their contribution.  
Without doubt, the international community needs rules of the game to regulate foreign 
investment on an equal footing across different states. Likewise, a well-functioning system for 
settling disputes is indispensable for a globalized economy. The cynical and increasingly 
widespread view that the current arbitral system serves no one but the lawyers and arbitrators is 
corrosive of the much needed trust in the fairness and efficiency of international dispute 
settlement. Against this background, international lawyers in particular should be concerned 
about safeguarding the fabric of existing international investment law. Major overhauls are 
probably needed. Such consolidation is particularly important after a period of exponential 
growth that may carry the seeds of its own destruction. 
                                                 
23 Cite CIFIUS, German and French legislation. 
24 On the last point, see William W. Park’s contribution to this volume and CATHERINE ROGERS, ETHICS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2009).  
25  
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One can no longer safely say that investment arbitration continues to inspire general confidence. 
But crucially: existing alternatives, such as national courts in host countries, do not necessarily 
inspire more confidence. It may well be the current system of resolving investment disputes are a 
second-best solution for as long as states are unwilling to hand over adjudicative power to well-
qualified individuals with security of tenure, such as the international investment court proposed 
by Gus van Harten. Compared to a baseline of arbitrators beholden to governments that was 
common in the late 19th century, the current system of ad-hoc mixed with institutional arbitration 
would seem an improvement. Yet as measured against highly developed domestic adjudication, 
one that appears presently unattainable in the international realm, the shortcomings of the current 
system are serious. Reform is essential. 
